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COMMENT
"ONCE VICTIM, ALWAYS VICTIM":

COMPENSATED INDIVIDUALS UNDER THE AMENDED
SENTENCING GUIDELINES ON FRAUD
JacquelineHarrington*
Until recently, courts disagreed over whether individuals who were
compensated by a thirdparty such as a bank or insurance company
ought to count as victims for purposes of the multiple-victim sentencing enhancement in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on
Fraud. The most recent Amendments to the Guidelines resolve this
split, permitting compensated individuals to be counted as victims
where their identity was used in the commission of the fraud. However, the new Guidelines do not resolve a separate split, likely to
become more divisive under the new Guidelines, over whether both
compensated individuals and their compensators can simultaneously be treated as victims for enhancement purposes. This
Comment argues that the retributive purpose of sentencing suggests
that the new Guidelines properly treat compensated individuals as
victims, but that they should be further amended to clarify that
treating both compensated individuals and their compensators as
victims causes impermissible double counting. Resolving this issue
is crucial to achieving the dominant purpose of the Guidelines:
consistent andfairpunishments throughoutthe federal courts.
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INTRODUCTION

"Once victim, always victim: that's the law!" In Thomas Hardy's famous work, Tess of the D'Urbervilles,Tess laments the permanent status of
victims.' Yet until recently, some individuals who might have been considered the victims of financial crime under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
on Fraud ("Guidelines") were stripped of the status of victimhood if they
were subsequently compensated by a third party, such as a bank or insurance company. For those compensated individuals, whether the phrase
"once victim, always victim" applied depended on which court heard their
case.2 The most recent Amendment to the Guidelines' enhancement at
§ 2B1.1 ends this sentencing disparity in fraud cases: compensated individuals can be victims under the new Guidelines. 3 Although the Amendment
resolves the split over the proper interpretation of the § 2B 1.1 enhancement,
it fails to address a separate, albeit subtler, dispute regarding whether compensated individuals and their compensators can simultaneously be counted
as victims.
In 2001, the United States Sentencing Commission added a sentencing
enhancement to § 2B 1.1 of the Guidelines for defendants who commit fraud
against multiple victims. 4 Under the Guidelines, a sentence is imposed by
determining where it falls on a grid.5 The point on the grid is located by
finding the base-level offense and adjusting up or down (usually up) by examining the severity of the crime and the criminal history of the

1. THOMAS HARDY, TESS OF THE D'URBERVILLES 261 (Scott Elledge ed., W. W. Norton &
Co. 3d ed. 1991) (1891) (exclamation mark added).
2.

See infra Part I.

3.
The Sentencing Commission resolved the issue of whether compensated individuals "can
be" victims. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. The question is whether compensated

individuals will be counted as victims by courts under the new Guidelines. See infra notes 28-29
and accompanying text.
4.

Compare U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.I (2000), with USSG § 2B1.1

(2001).
5.

The Guidelines were intended to be mandatory for judges. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1988)

("The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the

purposes set forth [in the Guidelines]." (emphasis added)). Since the Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005), the Guidelines are no longer mandatory; how-

ever, the Booker decision also indicated that lower courts should continue "to take account of the
Guidelines together with other sentencing goals." Id. at 259. Lower courts still look to the Guidelines in determining how to treat compensated individuals. See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 537

F.3d 480, 490-92 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that reimbursed account holders did not count as victims
by analyzing the relevant Guidelines' provisions); United States v. Lam Thanh Pham, 545 F.3d 712,
723 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Although the Guidelines are now discretionary, the Supreme Court has continued to indicate that a correct initial assessment of the Guidelines range is a starting point before the
discretionary judgment is made on a reasonable sentence in the light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors'"); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 894-95 (11 th Cir. 2005) (finding that reimbursed
individuals could count as victims after analyzing the relevant Guidelines' provisions); United States
v. Yagar, 404 E3d 967, 970 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[TIhe district court will need to consider the correct
Guidelines-recommendedsentence in fashioning its own post-Booker sentence on remand." (emphasis added)).
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defendant-the enhancements.6 The Guidelines provide that defendants receive a 2-level enhancement if there are more than 10 but fewer than 50
victims, a 4-level enhancement if there are between 50 and 250 victims, and
a 6-level enhancement if there are more than 250 victims. 7 Until the 2009
Amendments, the Application Notes to the Guidelines defined a victim as

"any person who sustained any part of the actual loss, ''s with actual loss further defined as the "reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted

Notes
from the offense."9 Pecuniary harm, the Guidelines' Application
°
money.
in
measurable
harm
or
harm
monetary
was
stated,
After these sentencing enhancements were enacted, a circuit split devel-

oped along two distinct lines. First, circuits disagreed over whether
individuals compensated by a third party had suffered "actual harm," and so
ought to be treated as victims.' Second, there was divergence as to whether
that compensated them as victreating both individuals and the institutions
2

tims was impermissible double counting.
For defendants who committed less serious crimes, involving more than
10 but fewer than 50 victims, a sentencing enhancement for multiple victims
might raise their sentence by only six months. But for more serious crimes,
involving greater than 250 victims, the enhancement could add years to a
defendant's sentence. 3 This difference of interpretation between the circuits
6.

PHYLIS

SKLOOT BAMBERGER,

PRACTICE

UNDER

THE

NEW FEDERAL

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES XXX-XXXi (1989); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996). For a more complete explanation of how the Guidelines work in practice, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key. Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 5
(1988).
7. USSG § 2B1.1 (2008). The initial enhancement provided for increases only where there
were "more than 10, but less than 50, victims" or "50 or more victims." USSG § 2B1.1 (2001). The
2002 revision added a further enhancement where there were "250 or more victims." USSG § 2B 1.1
(Supp. 2002). This provision has remained consistent throughout subsequent revisions, including the
most recent 2008 revision. USSG § 2B 1.1 (2008).
8. USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2008). The Application Notes are to be given equal weight to
the Guidelines themselves. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) ("[C]ommentary in the
Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that
guideline'"); see also United States v. Hemandez-Sandoval, 211 F.3d 1115, 1117 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[A]pplication notes are binding on the courts in their construction of the Sentencing Guidelines.").
9.

USSG § 2BI.l cmt. n.3(A)(i) (2008).

10.

Id. § 2Bl.1 cmt. n.3(A)(iii).

11.

See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.

12. Some courts thought both compensated individuals and their compensators could be
victims. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. Others thought this caused unfair double counting. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
13. A crime that was not particularly serious, with no other relevant enhancements, would
have a base level of six, which results in a sentence of 0 to 6 months in prison. USSG § 5A (2008).
With an enhancement for 10 or more victims, this result does not change; however, for 50 or more
victims, the base sentence increases to 6 to 12 months, and with 250 or more victims, the base sentence increases to 10 to 16 months. Id. The results are more extreme for more serious offenses. For
example, a fraud that started with a base level of thirty-seven, or 210 to 262 months, would increase
to between 262 and 327 months with 10 or more victims, 324 to 405 months with 50 or more victims, and life with 250 or more victims. Id. For an example of how the guidelines work in practice,
see supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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consequently undermined the overarching goal of the Guidelines, which was
to create consistent sentences for similar crimes across the federal court system. 14
The 2009 Guidelines address the split by adding a definition of victim
that includes individuals whose identities were used in the commission of a
fraud." The result of this addition is that even compensated individuals may
be victims under the new Guidelines. However, the Application Note is unclear regarding whether the two categories of victim are mutually exclusive
or whether the entity that sustained the "actual loss," the third-party compensator, and the person whose identification was used may both be victims.
In the past, some courts held that the victims who received restitution and
the victims under the Guidelines' sentencing enhancement ought to be identical.16 In fraud scenarios, this meant that these courts found that only thirdparty compensators, to whom defendants owed restitution, were treated as
victims. Under the
7 Amendments, this misunderstanding may perpetuate
double counting.
This Comment argues that while the new Guidelines properly allow
courts to consider compensated individuals to be victims for purposes of the
enhancement at § 2B 1.1, they should be further amended to eliminate the
possibility of double counting that occurs when courts treat both compensated individuals and their compensators as victims. Part I provides a brief
overview of the new § 2B 1.1, concluding that the Commission addressed
only one point of disagreement among the courts. Part II argues that allowing compensated individuals to be treated as victims comports with
retributive goals of punishment, but that reading the Amendment to permit
double counting would be inconsistent with retribution. Part III contends
that the Commission should modify the Guidelines to avoid double counting
by clarifying that the victims who receive restitution and the victims
counted under the Guidelines' enhancement need not be identical. The
Commission's failure to address double counting is likely to result in a continued circuit split, undermining the ability of the Guidelines to fulfill their
primary purpose of ensuring uniform sentencing in federal courts.
I.

THE NEW §

2B 1.1:

RESOLVING ONE SPLIT,

LEAVING ANOTHER UNRESOLVED

In revising the Guidelines' provision on fraud, the Sentencing Commission sought to end one part of the circuit split that had arisen over

14.
See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 5 (1972) (explaining that guidelines
were needed to address the "almost wholly unchecked" powers of sentencing authority vested in
judges); see also Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 229-30 (1993).
15.

See infra note 19 and accompanying text.

16.

See infra Part II.

17.

See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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interpretations of the word "victim."'" The majority view under the old
Guidelines was that fully compensated individuals were no longer victims,
while the minority approach asserted that such compensated individuals
remained victims. The Amendment to the Guidelines resolves this particular
aspect of the circuit split in favor of the minority view, but leaves unaddressed the second point of disagreement regarding double counting of
victims under the § 2B 1.1 enhancement.
The 2009 Guidelines address the circuit split by adding a definition of
victim that includes individuals whose "means of identification [were] used
unlawfully."' 9 "Means of identification" includes "any name or number that
may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify
a specific individual."20 By including such individuals, the Commission recognized that the victims of fraud, even if "fully reimbursed, must often
spend significant time resolving credit problems and related issues, and such
lost time may not be adequately accounted for in the loss calculations under
the guidelines. 2'
The majority view under the old Guidelines had been that individuals
counted as victims only where they had suffered a loss beyond that for
which they were compensated, and so had suffered an "actual loss."'22 Although the Guidelines rely on the assumption that individuals frequently do
suffer a loss beyond the loss for which they are compensated, this new
18.

The Commission had taken note of the circuit split, and the amended Guidelines were

aimed at addressing it. U.S.

SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES

4 (2009) [hereinafter AMENDMENTS], available at http://www.ussc.gov/2009guid/20090501_
Reader_.FriendlyAmendments.pdf ("Some courts have held that such an individual is not counted
as a 'victim' for purposes of the victims table at § 2B 1.1 (b)(2).").
19.

Id. at7.

20.

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) (2006).

21.

AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 4.

22. The majority view was that compensated individuals were not victims unless they had
suffered uncompensated harm. See United States v. Orr, 567 F.3d 610, 616-17 (10th Cir. 2009)
(finding that only the banks, not the reimbursed account holders, were victims); United States v.
Adjei, No. 07-2295, 2009 WL 405680, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 19, 2009) (holding that individuals were
victims where evidence indicated that they spent time and money seeking reimbursement, thus
sustaining part of the actual loss); United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that reimbursed account holders had not suffered an actual loss and so were not victims); United
States v. Abiodun, 536 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding reimbursed account holders had suffered an actual loss and were victims where they had expended effort to obtain compensation);
United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that where the defendant used
commercial credit accounts at various stores to defraud account holders, the only victims were the
stores because the account holders were fully reimbursed for their losses); United States v. Erpenbeck, 532 F.3d 423, 442 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that compensated individuals were not fully
compensated and so should be treated as victims); United States v. Lam Thanh Pham, 545 F.3d 712,
721 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that costs associated with resolving disputed account activity and initiating fraud investigations were actual losses); United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir.
2007) (holding that the Walgreens corporation was the only victim where defendant shoplifted from
multiple Walgreens stores but the corporation fully repaid the individual stores); United States v.
Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding reimbursed individuals had not suffered an actual
loss and so were not victims); Conley v. United States , No. 1:07-CV-1 11l,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8391, at *8-9 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 5, 2008) (noting that the trial court properly applied Yagar by finding that individual account holders were not "victims" for Guidelines' purposes where they were
fully reimbursed).
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provision, which permits individuals to retain their status as victims where
their identity has been used, does not require that they have suffered un-

compensated loss. The Amendment, therefore, takes a position similar to
that of the minority courts under the split.2 3 By allowing even fully compen-

sated individuals to be counted as victims, the revision both addresses the
circuit split over the treatment of compensated individuals, and as discussed
in Part II, allows the Guidelines to better comply with the goals of retribution.
Although the new Guidelines clarify that compensated individuals can
be victims, they do not offer courts guidance regarding whether double
counting is permissible. Under the old Guidelines, the circuits that treated

reimbursed individuals as victims where they had expended time and energy
sometimes also treated their compensators as victims.14 For example, where
a bank compensated its account holders for their losses, the court might treat
both the compensated account holders and the bank as victims under the
enhancement. However, some courts thought this caused double counting, or
holding the defendant liable twice on the basis of the same actual loss. 2 As a
result, one judge argued that the role of the court "is not to decide whether
there was any victim who sustained the loss, but to choose between two
possible victims. ' ' 26 Courts that treated both groups as victims were in the
23. The Eleventh Circuit's minority view was that compensated individuals remained victims, even when they were fully and quickly reimbursed by their banks. United States v. Smiley, 210
F. App'x 972, 975 (11 th Cir. 2006) (finding that "victims who are reimbursed for their losses are still
victims for purposes of § 2B 1.1 (b)(2)"); United States v. Cornelius, 202 F App'x 437, 439 (11
thCir.
2006) ("[T]he Guidelines allow a court to find an actual loss by a reimbursed party, and therefore
treat that party as a victim."); United States v. Longo, 184 F. App'x 910, 913 (11th Cir. 2006)
("[R]eimbursement does not preclude any of the persons who suffered an actual loss from being
considered victims under § 2B1.1(b)(2)."); United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 894-95 (11 th Cir.
2005) (finding that compensated individuals still suffered an actual loss). The First Circuit recently
adopted the position of the Eleventh Circuit in two decisions issued on the same day. See United
States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that reimbursed account holders were
victims); United States v. Ter-Esayan, 570 F.3d 46, 51 (1 st Cir. 2009) (same).
24. See Lam Thanh Pham, 545 F.3d at 718 (explaining that where there was an initial loss to
account holders and a permanent loss of the same funds by a third-party compensator, the two
groups had suffered harms that were "sufficiently distinct from one another to avoid a double counting problem"); see also Ter-Esayan, 570 F.3d at 50 (affirming the district court's decision to
consider "238 individuals, 26 banks, and the Stop & Shop chain" to be victims); Abiodun, 536 F.3d
at 166 ("Taking these [compensated] individuals together with the 'dozens' of corporate victims and
the 'small percentage of individuals who actually did lose money,' the District Court determined that
it was 'more likely than not' that Abiodun's crimes affected '250-plus victims,' ....
").
The explanation given by the Lam Thanh Pham court was that the two groups had suffered distinct harms;
however, it did not fully elucidate what this meant. 545 F.3d at 718 ("Just as a single gunshot would
have two victims suffering two distinct injuries if the bullet passed through one person before striking a second, here Pham's criminal acts could have two groups of victims suffering distinct
pecuniary harms where the debits to the account balances first suffered by the account holders were
later absorbed by the banks.").
25. See United States v. Moore, 315 F. App'x 16, 18 (9th Cir. 2008) ("To avoid doublecounting, the individual account owners and the banks who reimbursed them cannot both be victims
on the basis of the same stolen funds.").
26. Lam Thanh Pham, 545 F.3d at 726 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Judge Fisher also noted that, "No other circuit has held that two victims can both be
counted under the Guidelines based on the same 'actual loss' of funds." Id. Similarly, an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision warned against treating account holders and banks as victims. See supra note
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minority. The majority view was that fully reimbursed individuals did not
qualify as victims; these majority courts did not often encounter any doublecounting problem because only the compensator was considered a victim.
Further, some courts in the minority treated only compensated individuals
and not their compensators as victims. 27 Because the majority view is no
longer valid, however, double counting may now be a problem in all cases
rather than in just the minority of courts.
The old Guidelines were unclear about whether both groups could suffer
the same "actual loss" and therefore simultaneously be victims, and the new
Guidelines are similarly unclear. The new Guidelines explain that, "in a case
involving means of identification 'victim' means (i) any victim as defined in
Application Note 1; or (ii) any individual whose means of identification was
used unlawfully or without authority.' 28 The definition of a victim in Appli'
cation Note 1 is "any person who sustained any part of the actual lOSS. 29
The new Guidelines could be interpreted as meaning that the victim is
either the individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully (ii)
or the third party that suffered the actual loss (i). Alternatively, it might
mean that both the compensated individuals whose identities were used and
their compensators may be victims (i and ii). The second interpretation has
the potential to lead to double counting. This ambiguity ought to be resolved
by the Commission. But until it is, courts seeking to resolve the conflict
should treat only compensated individuals as victims for purposes of the
enhancement; doing so will best accord with retribution policies, as highlighted by Part II.

II.

READING THE NEW GUIDELINES TO ACHIEVE PROPER
AMOUNTS OF RETRIBUTION

Retribution, or meting out of "just deserts," continues to be a major purpose of sentencing today,3 ° and it is best satisfied by treating only
compensated individuals as victims. In the Guidelines, this goal is expressed
by the directive that sentences "reflect the seriousness of the offense" and the
"nature and circumstances of the offense., 3 As evidenced by various Supreme
Court opinions and scholarly views, "just punishment"-retribution--is an
25 and accompanying text. The later Lam Thanh Pham court decision did not acknowledge the
Moore decision at all.
27.
See, e.g., Longo, 184 F. App'x at 912-13 (considering "whether each plan counts as a
single victim or whether each individual participant in the plan counts as a victim" and concluding
that the "plan participants should be counted as victims").
28.

AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 5.

29.

Id. at 2 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 1(2008)).

30.

NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL., SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY 9 (2d ed. 2007).

31.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)-(B) (2006). Some commentators, however, suggest
that retributivism provides the outer margins of sentencing, arguing that "limiting retributivism" is
the overriding purpose of sentencing and "that retribution sets the upper and lower boundaries of
just punishment, within which other purposes can hold sway." DEMLEITNER ET AL., supra note 30,
at 8; see also Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2006).
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important rationale for sentencing in fraud cases." This Part uses hypotheticals to explain why treating compensated account holders as victims under the
Amendments properly accounts for the seriousness of certain fraud offenses.
However, this Part also argues that if the amended enhancement is interpreted
to mean that both compensated individuals and their compensators are victims, defendants will be punished beyond their culpability.
Achieving the correct level of retribution has been an important motivator behind the Sentencing Commission's enactment of sentencing
enhancements for multiple victims, including the most recent Amendments.
That Congress included a sentencing enhancement for multiple victims in
the old Guidelines under § 2B 1.1, and that the Amendments allow individuals whose identities were compromised during a fraud to be counted as
victims, indicates that in some cases, the "scope of the crime" cannot be
fully measured without viewing compensated individuals as victims.33 In
many fraud cases, the seriousness of an offense is adequately captured only
where compensated individuals are treated as victims, which the Amendments properly permit when a victim's identity is used. If compensated
individuals were never treated as victims, the goal of retribution would be
inadequately served by the victim enhancement in § 2B1l.1.3 4 Consider the
following scenarios:
Defendant commits the exact same fraud of $100,000 per person against
the following individuals:
Situation 1. 30 uninsured people.
Situation 2. 30 people insured by 30 different insurance companies.
Situation 3. 30 people insured by 1 insurance company.

The overall monetary harm in each case is exactly the same, $3,000,000
taken from 30 individuals. Yet under a system that never treats fully compensated individuals as victims, there are 30 victims under Situation 1, and
only 1 victim under Situation 3, because all individuals have been compensated by the same insurance company. Even more bizarre, there are 30
victims in Situation 2, which is identical to the compensation pattern in
32. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 348 (2007) (arguing that the Guidelines necessitate a
consideration of "'just punishment' (retribution)" by the sentencing judge); see also Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1997) (indicating that there are "two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution [and] deterrence"); United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993)
("§ 3C1.1 enhancement ... furthers legitimate sentencing goals relating to the principal crime,
including the goals of retribution and incapacitation."); Adam Lamparello, The Unreasonableness of
"Reasonableness" Review: Assessing Appellate Sentencing Jurisprudence After Booker, 18 FED.
SENT'G REP. 174, 174 (2006) ("Booker's emphasis on the factors enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
empowers district courts to fashion principled sentencing decisions that consider and further the
traditional purposes of punishment, that is, retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation.").
33.

United States v. Mohammed, 315 F. Supp. 2d 354, 362 (S.D.N.Y 2003).

34. No court has taken such an extreme hypothetical position. The Yagar court came closest,
but the dicta providing an exception where the loss was not "short-lived and immediately covered by
a third party" meant that even the Sixth Circuit did not adopt the view that compensated individuals
were never victims. United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 971 (6th Cir. 2005).
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Situation 3, except that the victims were compensated by different insurance
companies rather than 1 insurance company.35 For a serious offense, this
could mean that a defendant's sentence might be as much as 117 months
longer if convicted under situation 2 rather than situation 3. 16 The extreme
hypothetical position of never treating compensated individuals as victims
yields results clearly at odds with notions of retribution because the defendant would be punished differently for these very similar crimes.
Even prior to the 2009 Guidelines, no court had taken the position that
compensated individuals could never be treated as victims. But the majority
approach, which argued that only individuals who have not been fully compensated could be treated as victims, still yielded illogical results.37 Consider
the following situations in addition to the situations above:
Defendant commits the exact same fraud of $100,000 per person against
the following individuals:
Situation 4. 30 people insured by the same insurance company who are
each compensated immediately.
Situation 5. 30 people insured by 30 different insurance companies who
are each compensated immediately.
Situation 6. 30 people insured by the same insurance company who are
each compensated one year after the initial fraud after substantial time and
energy was expended to obtain compensation.
Under the analysis of the majority view, there was only 1 victim in
Situation 4. But under Situation 5-arguably the exact same harm-there
were 30 different victims (the insurance companies), which required a sentencing enhancement under § 2B1.1 that could yield up to 117 additional
months.38 In both cases, the individuals were immediately compensated, yet
the defendant was punished differently. Finally, Situations 4 (1 victim) and 6
(30 victims), in which the defendant stole from 30 people insured by the
same insurance company, treated the defendant differently based on factors
he could not have "foreseen"-the amount of time that would pass before
the insurance company would compensate the individuals and the amount of
35. A similar hypothetical was put forth by the dissent in United States v. Conner. Judge
Garza explained:
To exemplify how the majority has turned the enhancement on its head, compare a defendant
who defrauds 1,000 individuals that, after the fact, have their losses reimbursed by a single insurer and a defendant who defrauds 10 uninsured individuals. Assuming an equal amount of
loss, there can be no doubt that the first defendant's crime is more serious and therefore deserving of a more severe sentence. The majority's interpretation of the victim enhancement
leads to the incongruous result of the second defendant receiving the higher Guidelines range.
United States v. Conner, 537 F3d 480, 494 (5th Cir. 2008) (Garza, J., dissenting). But see United
States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415,422-23 (3d Cir. 2009) (criticizing Garza's view because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory and judges can potentially deviate from the Guidelines in the
hypothetical Garza posits).
36.

See supra note 13.

37.

See supra note 22.

38.

See supra note 13.
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effort those individuals would have to expend to obtain compensation.
Again, the defendant could receive up to 117 additional months under Situation 6 based on how soon the account holders were compensated by an
entity completely outside of his control.39 Punishments are occasionally de-

cided based on factors beyond the defendant's direct control. For example, a
defendant who shoots a person intending to kill him will not be liable for
murder if he only wounds his victim. 40 However, in that case, the defendant's sentence depends on something arguably within his control: whether
he succeeds in killing the victim. In the case of fraud, it is irrational to allow
the defendant to experience a lower sentencing level based solely on something outside his control: namely, that one insurance company had a better
mechanism in place for compensating its account holders quickly and without hassle.
Odd results also occur when both the compensated individuals and their
compensators are treated as victims, as suggested by a different minority
approach prior to the 2009 Amendments. Courts employing this framework
treated compensated individuals as victims where they expended time and
energy to obtain compensation, but the courts also treated their compensators as victims. It is unclear whether the 2009 Guidelines permit both groups
to be treated as victims. Consider the following additional scenario:
Defendant commits the exact same fraud of $100,000 per person against
the following individuals:
Situation 7. 30 people insured by 30 different insurance companies who
are each compensated one year after the initial fraud after substantial time
and energy was expended to obtain compensation.

Under the pre-Amendment, minority double-counting approach, Situation 4 yielded 1 victim and Situation 5 yielded 30 victims. Yet in Situation 6,
there would have been 31 victims (30 account holders plus the insurance
company), and in Situation 7 there would have been 60 victims (30 account
holders plus 30 insurance companies). In Situation 7, the defendant could
have received a sentence that was up to 195 months longer than that received under Situation 4, and 143 months longer than that received under
Situations 5 or 6.

39.

See supra note 13.

Murder and attempted murder are treated differently by the Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2A1.1, 2A2.1 (2008). First-degree murder has a base level of 43,
or life in prison; attempted murder has a base level of only 33, or 135-168 months where the underlying offense would have constituted first-degree murder had the crime been successful. See id.
§ 5A. Felony murder, where the defendant is punished for murder even though the defendant's partner actually committed the murder, is another example. See Dean v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1849,
1855 (2009) (giving the felony-murder rule as an example of punishing defendants "for the unintended consequences of their unlawful acts"). But see id. at 1859 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing a case where the defendant's sentence was increased for the unintended discharge of
his firearm during a crime from the case of felony murder because with felony murder the "enhanced penalties [are] for the infliction of some additional harm").
40.

41.

See supra note 13.
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Under the double counting that could take place under the Amendments,
Situations 4 and 6 would both yield 31 victims, because the time and effort
expended by an individual whose identity was unlawfully used is irrelevant
under the Amendments. Similarly, Situations 5 and 7 would both have 60
victims. Again, the sentence under Situations 5 and 7 could be up to 143
42
months longer than that received under Situations 4 and 6. This result may
be even stranger than the results obtained when compensated victims are not
be seen as being puntreated as victims at all because the defendant could
loss. 43
ished twice on the basis of a single financial
The unfair results that may occur under the 7 situations above are corrected by treating fully compensated individuals as victims, which the new
enhancement permits, but not treating their compensators as victims, which
may or may not be permitted by the new enhancement. In all 7 situations,
whether the victims are not compensated by an insurance company, compensated by one insurance company, or compensated by multiple insurance
companies, and whether the victims are compensated easily or after expending their time, the defendant would be treated the same for purposes of the
enhancement: there would be 30 victims and the defendant would receive an
enhancement under all 7 situations. Rather than viewing these very similar
crimes as having a different number of victims, each crime would have the
same number of victims and the defendant would consequently be sentenced
with the same 2-level enhancement under each scenario. This would yield a
maximum sentence of 372 months for each situation, rather than a maximum of 262 months if only the banks were treated as victims, or a
maximum of 405 months if both account holders and banks were treated as
victims.4
This result logically fits with an understanding of retribution, which
punishes defendants based on notions of justice: Defendants should certainly be punished to the extent that they are culpable, and to the extent to
which that culpability is foreseeable to them. But there is no retributive justification for punishing them beyond their culpability. Rather than punishing
defendants differently for a crime that affected thirty people, this system
treats them the same. Courts interpreting the new Guidelines should now
find that compensated individuals and not their compensators are the victims
for purposes of the § 2B1.1 enhancement. As discussed in Part III, the next
amendment to the Guidelines should clarify that this is the correct result.

42.

See supra note 13.

43. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. This result depends on how many victims are
actually involved in the scheme and whether the double counting results in a high enough victim
count to push the defendant into a new enhancement category. See supra note 7 and accompanying
text.
44.

See supra note 13.
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FUTURE AMENDMENTS SHOULD CLARIFY THAT
DOUBLE COUNTING IS NOT PERMITTED

Because the new Guidelines can be read to permit double counting in
spite of the fact that such a reading does not comport with retributive goals,
the Commission should further modify the Guidelines to clarify that the
victim under the § 2B 1.1 enhancement and the victim who receives restitution need not be identical.45 Under the old Guidelines, courts justified
treating third-party compensators as victims because they were owed restitution, and courts thought that the restitution victim and Guidelines' victim
should be identical even though the restitution statute is separate from the

Guidelines. This confusion will continue to pose a problem under the
Amendments because it provides courts with support for double counting.
Courts might treat both compensated individuals whose identities were stolen and their compensators as victims, because the compensators were
entitled to restitution. The next amendments should consequently clarify the
distinction between the two categories of victims so that courts do not treat
both compensated individuals, whose identities were used in a fraud, and
their compensators, who receive restitution, as victims.
There can be a difference between a victim for restitution purposes under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act ("MVRA") and a victim for
§ 2B 1.1 Guidelines' purposes, although some courts were confused by this

point under the old Guidelines. 46 Both restitution under MVRA and loss cal-

culations under § 2Bl.1 "are often involved in the sentencing of many
federal economic crimes, 47 and as a result, some courts found that the

MVRA restitution victim and the Guidelines' enhancement victim ought to
be identical. MVRA was enacted in 2006 to expand victim restitution by
45. The Sentencing Commission does not appear to have considered resolving the doublecounting problem with the new Amendments. See AMENDMENTS, supra note 18, at 4. This makes
sense given that double counting was a relatively small problem prior to the Amendments. See supra
notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
46. See Catharine M. Goodwin, Comparison of the New Calculation of Economic "Loss"
with that of Restitution, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 1 (2002), http://www.ussc.gov/training/
Goodwin502.pdf ("[M]any orders of restitution have been vacated because the court confused
guideline 'loss' concepts with those of restitution.").
47.

Id.

48. There is evidence that some courts conflated the concept of restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (1996), with loss in the Guidelines. See, e.g.,
United States v. Conner, 537 F.3d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that because the "district court
ordered restitution only to the five companies that credited the accounts used to perpetrate the fraud"
the account holders were not victims); United States v. Icaza, 492 F.3d 967, 970 (8th Cir. 2007)
(pointing out that only the Walgreens corporation would receive restitution in the court's decision
finding that only the corporation, not the individual stores that had been reimbursed, was a victim);
see also Goodwin, supra note 46, at 1. Other courts and judges, however, are aware that there is a
difference between "an enhancement whose evident purpose is to gauge the magnitude of the crime,
not to apportion damages, restitution or tax liability." United States v. Stepanian, 570 F.3d 51, 57
(1st Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also Conner, 537 F.3d at 493 n.l (Garza, J., dissenting) ('A
party must suffer pecuniary loss to receive restitution, but a party may suffer an actual loss without
seeking restitution."); United States v. Smiley, 210 F. App'x 972, 975 (11th Cir. 2006) ("The fact
that the [victims] did not seek restitution does not mean that they did not sustain an actual loss.").
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requiring federal courts to order restitution in certain situations, including
fraud offenses. 49 Restitution allows for crime victims to recover "all or some
of their monetary losses. ' . °
The definition of victim under the Guidelines and MVRA need not be
identical. The purposes of loss versus restitution underscore this difference:
"Loss serves the multiple, and partly 'constructive,' purposes of representing
the relative seriousness of the offense and culpability of the offender, while
restitution is intended to compensate."' As a result, when courts look at
"victims" under the Guidelines in calculating loss, they should consider
only compensated individuals to be victims, because this will properly take
into account the seriousness of the offense.52 In contrast, when providing
restitution, courts should look at the party that suffered the ultimate loss,
which is the party that repaid the
53 individual who originally suffered the loss,
or the third-party compensator.
The Sentencing Commission should add a comment to explain this difference between restitution victims and § 28 1.1 victims. Such a comment
might simply clarify the new enhancement by explaining that where the
same loss is attributable to account holders and the third party that compensated them, only the "individual whose means of identification was used
unlawfully," or the account holders, should be counted for enhancement
purposes. The different goals of compensation for restitution and loss indicate that the victim for restitution purposes and the victim for purposes of
the Guidelines' enhancement need not necessarily be the same. Such a clarification would help courts avoid double counting and the resultant unjust
extra punishment to which defendants are potentially exposed.
CONCLUSION

When Tess famously cried out, "Once victim, always victim," she was
grieving the permanent status of victimhood. Tess lamented the fact that
victims could not escape their fate, yet the new Guidelines demonstrate that
the Sentencing Commission intended that compensated individuals whose
identities were used retain their status as victims for purposes of the § 28 1.1
enhancement. This Amendment to the Guidelines offers resolution to a split
that has persisted among the Circuits for several years, but it does not resolve a smaller discrepancy, likely to become larger under the Amendments,
about whether double counting is permissible. Until this split is addressed
49. Moma Murray & Sterling O'Ran, Restitution, in NATIONAL VICTIM ASSISTANCE ACADEMY TEXTBOOK, Ch. 5.2 (2002), http://ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/assist/nvaa2002/chapter5_2.html#l.
50.

DANIEL McGILLIS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIM RESTITUTION 5 (1986).

51.

Goodwin, supra note 46, at 12. Although the Goodwin commentary is not binding au-

thority for analysis of the Guidelines, it is found on the Sentencing Commission website under
educational materials.
52.

See supra Part II.

53.
Catharine M. Goodwin, The Imposition of Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, FED.
PROBATION, Dec. 1998, at 95, 98 ("[A] court may order restitution to a third party that compensates
" (emphasis added)).
the victim for loss caused by the defendant ..
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by further amendments, courts should let retributive goals of punishment
guide them to the conclusion that only the compensated individuals in such
cases should count as victims under the enhancement. At the same time, the
Sentencing Commission should consider revising the Guidelines to clarify
this point, ensuring that defendants do not receive inconsistent sentences
across the circuits so that their sentences comport with the retributive goals
of punishment.

